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METAPHOR AS APT FOR CONVERSATION 
THE INHERENTLY CONVERSATIONAL CHARACTER 
OF THEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE 
It has been suggested in a number of the papers at this conference that 
conversation, connectedness, encounter and relation are apt metaphors 
for the theological task in the twenty-first century - particularly apt for 
addressing pressing problems, which, if not unique to our day, at least 
have a new post-modem twist. Jacques Haers has proposed these as the 
root metaphors for a collaborative research program. Papers have inves-
tigated the aptness of the metaphors and made compelling cases for them 
as key paradigms for theological thinking. I suggest to the contrary that 
we reverse the formulation of the theme. Rather than focus attention on 
how conversation and encounter are apt metaphors for the theological 
project, we should consider how apt metaphor is for conversation. In fact, 
some conversations and related encounters, among which the religious 
and theological are included, could not take place without a metaphoric 
process. Properly speaking, talk of God is always rooted in and essentially 
related to a metaphoric process. That is my first claim. 
My aim in this initial reversal, however, is not to undercut the confer-
ence theme. The metaphoric process reveals itself to be intrinsically con-
versational. The metaphoric act presupposes dynamic shifts in shared 
fields of meanings that can only be undertaken and grasped through ongo-
ing interaction in language and in connectedness with others. Moreover 
encounter (in the most proper sense of the term) with God and with the 
neighbour is mediated by a metaphoric process. The research program 
envisioned in Professor Haers's paper and many of the others is more 
radical than the investigation of apt metaphors - even if we conceive 
them as root metaphors. To opt for such root metaphors is to call for 
teshuva l : a metaphoric turning or conversion in thinking and living. 
My second objective is to elaborate a bit on these contentions. 
I. For a discussion of the Huber ' s use of the term and an argument that God-talk 
involves such a " turning" (although described as grammatical, not metaphorical) see 
N. L ASH , Easter in Ordinary: Reflections on Human Experience and the Knowledge of 
God, Notre Dame, TN, University of Notre Dame Press, 1988, pp. 193 ff. 
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Inattention to this essentially conversational dynamic of our metaphoric 
discourse about God is at the root of significant confusions in religious and 
theological thinking. This occasion does not offer the opportunity to dis-
cuss specific cases at length, but I will cite instances, one of which I have 
analysed more fully in a recent issue of Theological Studies2• Developing 
these points, hopefully, will give some justification for concluding that con-
versation and encounter are not merely apt metaphors for theological think-
ing. Theological thinking as inherently metaphoric is, when successful, 
intrinsically conversational and fundamentally directed toward encounter 
with God and neighbour as other and mystery. Attention to the logic of this 
essentially conversational dynamic is crucial to understanding how we think. 
and talk about God and how we relate to neighbour - especially in our plu-
ralistic world with its many intersecting but also disparate conversations. 
My remarks here are part of a larger project to analyse the metaphoric 
tum in God-talk as a way to rethink the doctrine of analogy. In light of 
that broader argument, I will take the liberty of making presuppositions 
that a fuller treatment of the issues would need to justify. A brief 
acknowledgment of these assumptions must suffice to situate the context 
and basis for the case I am making. 
In Catholic theology, the appeal to analogy has played a pivotal role 
in explaining how understanding and language can meaningfully refer to 
God whose reality transcends human grasp. The "received" tradition 
traces the Catholic position to Thomas Aquinas's theory of analogy. How-
ever, convincing arguments have been made that Aquinas never proposed 
an explicit theory or even appealed to analogous uses of language in a 
consistent way over the course of his career3. Perhaps more importantly, 
the use and understanding of analogy in Catholic theology has gradually 
moved away from the scholastic conceptual framework of the received 
tradition. This shift in understanding, however, has not been adequately 
articulated or explained. Often it is not even acknowledged4• This became 
2. R. M ASSON, Analogy and the Metaphoric Process, in TS 62 (2001 ) 571-596. 
3. For a treatment of this issue see D. BURRELL, Aquinas: God and Action, Notre Dame, 
IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 1979, p. 55. 
4. For example, the Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (3rd ed., 1997) does 
not note this shift or its import. George Klubertanz's article in the New Catholic Ency-
clopedia (1981) details the historical development of the notion of analogy in Thomistic 
thought without acknowledging the difference between such accounts and the way appeals 
to analogy actuaUy work in contemporary theological figures like Karl Rahner or the influ-
ential philosopher of the doctrine, Erich Przywara. Contemporary theologians, like Eliza-
beth Johnson, who self-consciously have appropriated this transition in understanding con-
tinue, nevertheless, to explain analogy in traditional conceptual language which conceals 
both the shift itself and its significance. 
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evident to me in my own investigations of Karl Rahner's theology. 
His use of analogous language is far more subtle, innovative and effec-
tive than his explanation of analogy. Inattention to such unarticulated but 
fundamental moves in his thought is the source of significant misunder-
standing among some commentators and critics5. I believe that this is not 
a peculiarity of Rahner or others indebted to Thomistic tradition but is true 
in general of theological and philosophical reflection on analogy. By and 
large, explanation has not matched the exercise of the analogical imagi-
nation. Nor has the connection between the analogical imagination and 
metaphoric imagination, or their relationship with the dialectical imagi-
nation, been explained satisfactorily. 
In this context, the theory of metaphoric process and understanding of 
analogy advanced in the interdisciplinary reflections of the theologian 
and literary theorist, Mary Gerhart, and the physicist, Allan Russell, stand 
out as a unique contribution6. Their conception offers an innovative, per-
spicuous, coherent and persuasive explanation of what happens when 
believers and theologians stretch language, and are stretched by language, 
to speak and think of God. Perhaps familiarity with their position cannot 
be taken for granted. It is not clear that their position is known widely out-
side American theological circles7. More significantly, it is not clear how 
many, even in American circles, appreciate the significant potential of 
Gerhart and Russell's contribution beyond its immediate pertinence to 
the dialogue between science and religion. Their publications have, for 
the most part focused on that issue and related methodological concems8. 
The theological illustrations they offer, while suggestive, are limited to 
brief sketches. Their studies do not directly address the conceptual con-
fusion surrounding theological appeals to analogy and do not test in any 
5. The case for this claim will have to be made in other places but I believe an exam-
inations of the writings of what might be calJed a " Yale school" interpretation of Rahner 
in the 1970' s and 1980' s, Thomas Sheehan's influential analysis of Rahner's philosophi-
cal roots, and Roger Haight 's appropriation of Rahner's theology of symbol would show 
that aU miss the metaphoric shift intrinsic to Rahner's argumentation. 
6. See M. GERHART - A. RUSSELL, Metaphoric Process: The Creation of Scientific and 
Religious Understanding, Fort Worth, TX, Texas Christian University, 1984; and their 
further elaborations of the theory in The Cognitive Effect of Metaphor, in Listening 25 
(1990) 114-126, and New Mapsfor Old: Explorations in Science and Religion, New York, 
Continuum, 2001. 
7. For example, their work is not cited in any of the essays in recent colJection edited 
by Leuven' s professors, L. BOEVE - K. FEY AERTS (eds.), Metaphor and God-talk, 
New York, Peter Lang, 1999. 
8. The one instance of extended analysis of which I am aware is the fourth chapter of 
New Maps for Old [originally published with Joseph P. Healey in Semina 61 (1993) 167-
182] analysing the metaphoric process implicit in the Mosaic identification of Yahweh 
and El. 
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detail the theory's ability to explain the conceptual moves of specific the-
ologians and do not explore the theory's potential to resolve particular 
theological controversies. So my larger project entails, in part, establish_ 
ing how and why I think their theory can be helpful in addressing such 
issues. Moreover, although the case I will make here for the inherently 
metaphoric and conversational character of theological discourse pre-
supposes their theory, it also seeks to illustrate its explanatory power and 
in that way to argue for it. Whether the specific details of their theory 
merit this close attention will hinge in the end on the theory 's ability to 
clarify such issues. The Theological Studies article I mentioned was one 
foray in that direction. What follows is another limited engagement. 
I. THE METAPHORIC PROCESS ACCORDING TO GERHART AND RUSSELL 
Gerhart and Russell 's proposal summarizes and builds on an extensive 
body of research in philosophy and literature on metaphor. The focus of 
concern, as they have been at pains to emphasize, however, is not on 
metaphor or analogy as such, but on the fundamental epistemological 
process underlying the creation of new understanding in science and in 
religion. Metaphors have a part in their understanding in so far as they 
are manifestations of that epistemic process. But the decisive step in their 
theory is the role which the underlying process plays in changing the 
fields of meanings in an inquiry. Rather than merely augmenting what is 
already known, the metaphoric process creates the possibility for new 
meanings and understanding. Paul Ricreur comments that this is the 
"most remarkable contribution" of their proposal9• 
Their argument presupposes that our inquiries about the world and our-
selves take place in what can be imagined as cognitive spaces or worlds 
of meanings. These worlds of meanings are composed of networks of 
interrelated concepts. Physics, theology, a religion, or common sense, as 
defined by a particular time and culture, are examples of such fields of 
meanings. The concepts within these fields do not stand directly for things 
in themselves, but for our notions of these things. These notions are 
defined by their interrelation with other notions. For example, to get some 
conception of "house", one must have other notions available (lumber, 
bricks, wall, window, roof, and so forth). These other notions are vari-
able, as well as the relations between them, so meaning" arises out of the 
interaction of concepts and relations, and is expressed in the topography 
9. GERHART - R USSELL, Metaphoric Process (n. 6), p. xii. 
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of the field. Necessary concept changes, such as those which might arise 
from a new experience, alter relations ; and changes in relations, such as 
occur when one attempts to understand an experience in a new way, relo-
cate old concepts"lO. Consider the difference in the concept that "bun-
galow" would call to mind by the interaction of such notions: in India 
(a thatched or tiled one-story dwelling surrounded by a wide veranda), in 
Aberdeen, Scotland (a small granite cottage huddled between similar 
structures) or in New England (a single story wood framed home). Even 
among those who share a world of meanings, the understandings of such 
notions can vary somewhat from person to person, depending on factors 
such as background, education and linguistic sophistication. Moreover, 
meanings can change over time if new associations are made between 
exjsting notions, or if a new notion is added to a field of meanings. In the 
Gospels, when Jesus identifies the notion of Messiah with that of the Suf-
fering Servant, the association significantly alters not only these notions 
but, as well, a host of other notions related to the idea of eschatological 
expectation (a field of meanings), if not the very fabric of Jewish faith 
(a still broader field of meanings)". 
In the view of Gerhart and Russell, a world of meanings is made up 
of collections of such fields of meanings and it "comprises the basis for 
an individual's idea of the way things are" 12. The theory regards the indi-
vidual's or community 's construal, when it is successful, as correspond-
ing in a genuine but complex way to reality. On the other hand, the the-
ory also holds that " worlds of meaning are culture-bound. Within a 
particular culture, persons have worlds of meanings that have the same 
general topography despite the fact that a particular field of meanings 
possessed by one person may be completely absent in another" 13. These 
construals take place in conversation - in ongoing interaction in language 
and in community with others. 
What interests Gerhart and Russell is how new understandings and 
meanings develop among people who share such a world of meanings. 
They distinguish the discovery of new meanings from the acquisition of 
new knowledge that involves merely an addition of data that does not 
10. lD. , The Cognitive Effect of Metaphor (n. 6), p. 119. 
11. To what extent such alterations in meaning were effected, whether by Jesus or later 
interpreters, with what justification and with what success are of course the fault Lines of 
disagreement from which Christianity developed as a new religion and that continue to 
divide traditions of beliefs and schools of scholarship. That different historical and theo-
logical answers to such questions are possible, does not alter the fact that a metaphoric 
identification underlies the possibility of such new meanings and understandings. 
12. Ibid. , p. 120. 
13. Ibid. 
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change the notions or fields of meanings themselves. For example, we can 
learn of new cities or new planets and so gain additional information for 
ourselves or the field of astronomy. In doing this, however, we usually 
do not change the notions of "city" , " planet" , or "solar system". In con-
trast, Copernicus' s insistence that the sun is the centre of the universe or 
Newton 's insistence that the mechanical laws of the heavens are identi-
cal with the mechanical laws of the earth, created new understandings 
that changed fundamental notions within physics and indeed changed 
how ordinary people understood things. Much of the routine work of sci-
entists and theologians is devoted to the former sort of acquisition aimed 
at expanding the current knowledge base. Insights of the latter sort are 
occurrences of genius and discovery typically associated with more extra-
ordinary and consequential developments in a discipline. 
Analogy, broadly conceived, plays a key role in both processes. A cru-
cial element of Gerhart and Russell's proposal is the suggestion that we 
distinguish between three different though related ways of making an 
"analogy" that we can designate as "analogy", " simile", and "metaphor". 
In Gerhart and Russell ' s scheme " analogy" and "simile" are concep-
tual tools that often playa key role in the former task, the acquisition of 
additional information. Analogy in this definition involves the use of 
some feature common to two known realities to extend or expand our 
knowledge of either one of them, or, in some cases, both of them. Suc-
cessful analogies between the operations of the human mind and com-
puters, for example, could lead either to a better grasp of how the mind 
works, to the development of more sophisticated software, or to an 
enriched understanding of both minds and computers. 
Sometimes, only one of the analogues in question will be known. In that 
case, a known feature of one reality tells us something about another real-
ity that is unknown. This is what Gerhart and Russell understand to be the 
defining characteristic of simile. " So when Max Black wrote, 'The chair-
man plowed through the discussion ' , he created a text that instructs the 
reader who does not know how the discussion proceeded, and who now, 
on the comparative basis of the simile, does know"14. It is important for 
our exploration of the conversational character of such conceptual and 
linguistic moves to observe that whether Black' s proposition functions as 
an analogy or simile depends on the state of knowledge of the persons 
involved. A person who was present at the chairman's discussion would 
be in a position to agree with Black' s analogy or, as we say, to "get" 
14. Ibid., p. 116 quoting M. BLACK, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and 
Philosophy, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1962, p. 13. 
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the analogy and acquire a deeper insight into the event. That person, how-
ever, would not be acquiring new information about something unknown. 
Therefore, in Gerhart and Russell's account, for that person the proposi-
tion would be an analogy, not a simile. 
Gerhart and Russell note that with these definitions a great many of the 
comparisons we ordinarily think of as metaphors are, in their theory, 
either analogies or similes. As I mentioned previously, they are not 
proposing that literary concepts of metaphor need to be changed or aban-
doned. Their description of the "metaphoric process" is not intended as 
a comprehensive theory of metaphor or metaphorical usage. Rather, the 
goal is to direct our attention to an epistemological process that involves 
a third kind of analogy where, given the normal understanding of the 
notions within or between fields of meanings, there is no acknowledged 
similarity between a known" x" and" y". When such a situation obtains, 
saying that "x is y" forces an analogy between the two knowns that is 
uncalled for "thereby creating a similarity or analogy where none 
existed" 15. The distinguishing character of what Gerhart and Russell label 
the metaphoric process is that it distorts the given world of meanings. 
Once one gets the point of the metaphor - gets the point of affirming that 
"x is y"then "x", "y", and the coordinates (or field of meanings) in terms 
of which we had formerly understood them, are comprehended in a new 
way which makes it possible to conceive notions, understand relations, 
and envision as logical what could not have been so grasped before the 
metaphoric act. Gerhart and Russell stress "it is of particular importance 
to see that it is the theoretical structure of the meanings involved in 
metaphor that makes new knowledge possible. The distortion of the fields 
of meanings by means of the metaphoric process is a structural change 
that demands that other meanings and understandings have to be changed 
in the wake of the metaphor"I6. They contend, "This is what is so dif-
ferent about the metaphoric process. The analogical process, on the other 
hand, is an extension of meaning (as distinct from the creation of new 
meaning). The increased knowledge from analogy is primarily in terms 
of the original understandings" 17. 
Take the example of the early Christians ' affirmation that "Jesus is 
the Messiah". Given the images current in the eschatology of the day, 
affirming that God was victorious in the crucified son of a carpenter from 
Nazareth was uncalled for. In fact, most of the key eschatological images 
15. Ibid. , p. 121. 
16. 1D., Metaphoric Process (n. 6), p. 119. 
17. Ibid. 
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by which Jesus is identified in the Gospels have something of this 
metaphoric dimension. By ordinary logic he was not a victorious King of 
Israel; he was not a Son of Man who descended gloriously from the heav-
ens; he was not acknowledged by his people nor did he vanquish their 
enemies. To affirm that Jesus is the Messiah is to force an analogy 
between him and Israel's expressions of hope and trust in God. Forcing 
the analogy requires us to understand differently both Jesus and that hope 
itself. Affirming that Jesus is the Messiah, if taken seriously, forces a 
thoroughgoing revision of the field of meanings operative in Palestinian 
Judaism, or at least those operative in the narrative worlds of the New 
Testament. Given that shift in meaning, it is appropriate to say that Jesus 
literally and properly is the Messiah. 
According to Gerhart and Russell, Copernicus brought about a similar 
shift in scientific understanding. 
The sun (not the earth) is the center of the solar system." This is not a sim-
ile, nor is it an analogy. Furthermore, there is nothing unknown or ambigu-
ous about "the sun", nor about" center of the solar system." To insist, on 
the basis of no observational evidence, that one of the concepts is the 
other, conforms to our description of the linguistic expression of a 
metaphoric act. The identity between two hitherto different but known 
concepts changed a host of relations in fields of meanings and reformed 
the topography of the world of meanings. Testimony to the outrageous 
act is amply given in history 's descriptions of the reaction of religious 
authorities 18. 
They argue that Newton's equation of the mechanical laws of the heav-
ens with the mechanical laws of the earth "had perhaps an even more pro-
found effect on our lives"19 and that it was in similar ways metaphoric. 
To summarize, in Gerhart and Russell's theory a distinction must be 
made between two different epistemological processes that use analogies. 
What they refer to as the "analogical act" involves recognition of simi-
larities within or between given fields of meanings. These are what we 
ordinarily regard as analogies, similes and, in many instances, metaphors. 
When successful, the analogical act expands meanings within those fields 
without distorting the fields themselves. The "metaphoric act" also 
involves the recognition of similarities, but these similarities are the result 
of a "disruptive cognitive act" that forces an uncalled-for analogy within 
or between the fields of meanings - a distortion of one or both of these 
fields in order to achieve the required analogy. When this distortion is 
18. rD., The Cognitive Effect of Metaphor (n. 6), p. 124. 
19. Ibid. 
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productive it creates new understandings and meanings. For example, a 
new world of meanings, in fact a new religion, is created if one takes as 
true the affirmation that Jesus is the Messiah. 
II. THE METAPHORIC AND ANALOGICAL ACTS 
AS INHERENTLY CONVERSATIONAL 
These distinctions between the analogical act and the metaphoric act 
cannot be determined apart from the knowing processes of the persons 
entertaining them. Metaphoric and analogical construals take place 
in ongoing interaction in an already-given world of meanings and in 
community with others. These are inherently conversational processes. 
For example, as a successful metaphoric act gains acceptance and begins 
to effect permanent transformations in a field of meanings, the uncalled-
for analogy becomes more and more obvious. After a while, it is taken 
for granted. It becomes a "given" in the new but now stabilized field of 
meanings. The metaphor dies or perhaps more accurately is transformed 
into an analogy, simile, or univocal concept. It was a metaphoric act for 
Copernicus, and those who accepted his affirmation, to insist the sun is 
the centre of the solar system, or for Newton, and Newtonians, to insist 
on the identity of heavenly and earthly mechanics. Such insistence would 
not constitute a metaphoric act today. 
That the propositions could be metaphoric for Copernicus and Newton 
but univocal for us demonstrates that whether the act terminates in 
metaphor, analogy, simile, a univocal concept or an equivocation is deter-
mined in part by the knowledge state of the person entertaining it. As we 
saw with Black's example of the chairman ploughing through a discus-
sion, an analogy becomes a simile if the people entertaining the proposi-
tion were not at the discussion. Likewise, the persons must know both sets 
of relations for a metaphoric proposition to create a distortion in their 
fields of meanings. If they know only one of the two metaphoric ele-
ments, the proposition " functions as an analogy, since the unknown ele-
ment is free to move within the field. Such freedom removes the possi-
bility of tension or distortion of the field of meanings"20. Alternately, if 
the persons involved have different linguistic sensitivities or only appear 
to share fields of meanings, and because of different backgrounds or pre-
suppositions understand one or the other of the terms differently, then 
20. Ibid., p. 121. 
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what for one person is a metaphor, for a second could be merely an anal-
ogy, while a third might take the proposition as univocal. 
Let me illustrate with the example I mentioned of the Christian's insis-
tence that crucified Jesus is the Messiah. There are a number of ways 
of reading this affirmation. The reading I recommended above would 
construe the affirmation as metaphoric. The metaphoric reading chal-
lenges us to reconfigure fundamentally the fields of meanings involved 
in understanding Jesus, God's love, and humanity's relation to both. 
When Saint Paul, in the first letter to the Corintruans, acknowledged that 
this insistence is "illogical to those who are not on the way to salvation" 
(1 Cor 1,18)21, he recognized the necessity for fundamental changes in 
the fields of meanings associated with these concepts - indeed, the 
rhetoric of his argument presupposes and plays on the this conceptual 
reconfiguration. 
But, as Paul's admission allows, this is not the only logical reading 
possible. The proposition could also be conceived in Gerhart and Rus-
sell's terminology as analogical. On the analogical reading, there are some 
ways in which Jesus' activities and his impact were similar to the activ-
ities and impact associated with a New David, a Son of Man descending 
from the clouds of heaven, or the promised Messiah. But there are also 
obvious ways in which the analogy does not apply. So he is not literally 
the Messiah. Understood in this way, the analogy proposes to communi-
cate a deeper insight into the events, similar to what we saw with Black's 
proposition about a chairman ploughing through a meeting. Read as an 
analogical metaphor, the insistence that the crucified Jesus is the Messiah, 
however, does not require any realignment of our fields of meanings. 
It may add to knowledge but it does not create new meanings. It is sim-
ilar to information acquired from learning about the existence of new 
cities; it is different from the creation of new understanding in the Coper-
nican assertion that the Sun is the centre of the universe. 
It is possible to imagine several people disagreeing about whether and 
how such an analogical reading of Jesus as Messiah applies. The first 
might believe the analogy is warranted. Perhaps this person would be 
intent on showing how Jesus fulfilled what is essential about the scrip-
tural prophecies, even if Jesus did not literally descend from the heavens. 
For such a person, the identification of Jesus and the Messianic expecta-
tions is not simply univocal, but it is not merely a metaphorical trope 
either. That person's problem is to explain how this middle point is not 
an equivocation. It is possible to imagine a second more liberal believer 
21. The Jerusalem Bible. 
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who holds that Jesus is the Messiah but who sees this affirmation as more 
metaphorical and figurative. That person faces the charge of relativizing 
the Christian faith's claim. There is the third possibility of a secular his-
torian who does not believe that Jesus is the Messiah but who judges that 
the affirmation is warranted, or at least makes sense, but only figura-
tively. A fourth possibility is a more sceptical counterpart who holds that 
the identification of Jesus with such Messianic concepts is historically 
implausible, and that using the term figuratively is thus misleading and 
unjustified. Finally, there is the possibility of non-believers (for example, 
Jews or Muslims) who regard the analogy as untrue, even though such 
persons might have great respect for Jesus as a person and religious fig-
ure. Despite the real differences between each of these positions, all 
understand the affirmation, Jesus is the Messiah, as analogical in Gerhart 
and Russell's sense. What is in dispute between them is quite different 
than what is at issue on the first reading as a metaphoric analogy. This is 
true even though the believers who read the affirmation as an analogical 
metaphor might also cite Paul's text from 1 Corinthians for support. 
There are still other possibilities. We can envision a person whose 
understanding of Messianic hope and images is learned from a very lim-
ited reading of the New Testament. Or we can consider someone raised 
in the Jewish faith who learned about Jesus or the significance Christians 
attribute to Jesus by associating the concepts of Davidic promise and 
Messianic expectation with him. In these cases, we would have instances 
of what Gerhart and Russell call similes. The one analogue provides 
information about the other. There is an expansion of information but not 
a creation of new understanding or fields of meanings. 
Finally, there is the possibility of persons who interpret confession of 
Jesus' lordship as asserting a univocal identification of Jesus and the con-
cept of Messiah without a sense of the complexity involved in the affIr-
mation. There are both believers and sceptics who assume that this sort 
of univocal identification is the decisive question. And what is at issue 
for them is distinct from what is at issue in either an analogical reading 
or a metaphoric reading. 
The point of laying out all these possibilities is to illustrate that the 
same affirmation can be understood as an instance of metaphoric under-
standing for one person, analogical understanding for a second, and uni-
vocal understanding for third. On each of these readings what counts for 
the truth of the affirmation and what constitutes equivocation varies sig-
nificantly. Hence "reception" has to be taken into account to understand 
what is being signified. Reception is but one side of the give and take of 
conversation. Getting the meaning of a metaphoric act, or generating it 
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in the first place, presupposes dynamic and fundamental shifts in shared 
fields of meanings that are grasped in ongoing dialogue. So the genera-
tion and sustaining of metaphoric meaning requires a give and take 
between conversation partners, between their fields of meanings, and 
between their worlds and those networks of meanings. Moreover, where 
there is conversation, shared fields of meanings, and ongoing fundamen-
tal shifts in some of these meanings, there is also the possibility that one 
party might get the other's analogy differently, get it wrongly or might 
not get it at all because a metaphoric shift is not recognized, not accepted 
or confused with an analogical shift. The point at issue between these 
positions has as much to do with how something is said - and heard -
(as metaphoric, analogical or univocal) as it does with what is said. Fun-
damental disagreement about the former is likely to preclude or at least 
confuse meaningful resolution of the latter. 
The research program Haers proposes requires attention to this con-
nection between the metaphoric process and conversation. This connec-
tion has positive and negative aspects. Both underline the intrinsic and 
mutual connection between metaphoric process and conversation. Posi-
tively, the metaphoric invitation to force an uncalled for analogy and the 
consequent shifts in shared fields of meanings is key to the generation of 
new knowledge among conversation partners. It enables conversation 
partners to recognize, say, and explain something new which they could 
not have. understood or said before. The conversation could not advance 
in this new direction without the metaphoric act. For example, the gen-
eration of Christian faith and community presupposes and is effected in 
the metaphoric proclamation of Jesus as Lord. And likewise, the 
metaphoric act could not take place without a community in conversation, 
just as the proclamation of Jesus as Lord, presupposes a community 
whose field of meanings and whose experience of Jesus allow for the 
possibility of recognizing the affirmation's force. Moreover, if the 
metaphoric act is to continue to carry its force, and so its meaning, the 
community's conversation must have resources to sustain the new mean-
ing and communicate it. The liturgical retelling of the Gospels and devel-
opment of doctrine thus work to revivify the revelatory and extraordi-
nary character of the Christian community's confession. 
Negatively, the possibility for missing or mistaking metaphoric shifts 
in fields of meanings provides the potential for misunderstandings that can 
confuse or preclude genuine conversation. The force of a metaphoric shift 
in meanings is an invitation and conceptual move that can be missed, 
refused or confused (taken as mere analogy or simile). The point, here, 
would be missed if we simply thought it a matter of misunderstanding 
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caused by people having different presuppositions. Difference in presup-
positions could be taken merely to mean either knowing different things 
within a shared field of meanings or having different fields of meanings. 
The creation of new knowledge in the metaphoric act is different than 
what is at issue in those two instances. In the first, the matter has to do 
with expanding knowledge within a given field of meanings. (Learning 
more facts about Jesus.) In the second, the matter could concern simply 
a expansion of one's fields of meanings. (A Christian learns how Jews 
and Muslims understand holiness.) Although there is an expansion of 
meaning in both cases, neither requires a reformulation or shifts in fields 
of meanings, and so neither would be metaphoric. (One can learn what 
it means, at one level at least, for Christians to say "I believe Jesus is 
Lord", without getting the metaphoric force of the affirmation.) 
III. THE METAPHORIC AND CONVERSATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF GOD TALK 
Had we the time, I would want at this point to demonstrate how the-
ological discussion gets into trouble when we are inattentive to the 
metaphoric character of God-talk and its intrinsically conversational 
dimensions. The article in Theological Studies, to which I referred pre-
viously, examines one illustration: Joseph Bracken ' s "Process" response 
to Elizabeth Johnson's revised "Thomist" account of divine providence. 
Bracken's critique misses altogether her argument's metaphoric thrust. 
The issue for him is whether "process" or "substance" provides the 
more apt metaphor for God. Johnson's position presupposes a more fun-
damental shift in understanding how we talk about God in the first place. 
Her revision of Thomism presupposes that Aquinas himself stretched 
language, and that we must stretch language today, not to identify esse 
or substance as the best analogy for God, or to identify any analogy for 
God as best, but to identify God as unlike any other being or substance. 
On this point, at least, my interpretation of her argument is in agreement 
with Denys Turner ' s interpretation in this volume of classical, late 
antique and medieval apophaticism. I think I could also enlist support 
from Turner's paper for emphasizing, in response to Bracken, that 
stretching language this way, though a rejection of the kind of onto the-
ology advance in Process Theology, is not an abandonment of rigorous 
philosophical argumentation about God's existence and identity. 
Turner's argument supports , further, my contention that we speak 
properly of God only when we are brought by such argumentation to 
the recognition, that God is beyond the grasp of our conceptions. 
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Turner shows that the point of Pseudo-Denys "is to demonstrate that 
our language leads us to the reality of God when, by a process simul-
taneously of affirming and denying all things of God, by, as it were in 
one breath, both affirming what God is and denying, as he puts it, " that 
there is any kind of thing that God is "22, we step off the very boundary 
of language itself, beyond every assertion and every denial , into the 
" negation of the negation" and the "brilliant darkness "23 of God"24. 
Turner offers a similar reading of Aquinas : " So what the five ways 
prove is simultaneously the existence of, and the unknowability of, God: 
God is shown to exist, but what is also shown is that, in that case, 
we have almost lost our grip on the meaning of " ... exists" as predi-
cated of God" 25. 
I do not know whether Professor Turner would find helpful my further 
description of such language as metaphoric, but the case he makes cer-
tainly fits the paradigm. He does not hesitate to affirm that for Pseudo-
Denys and Aquinas the principle of apophaticism is necessarily at the 
same time the general principle of cataphaticism. He shows how the logic 
of this argumentation entails a " paradoxical conjunction of opposites". 
He insists that for Aquinas "God must be thought of as off every scale 
of sameness and difference and thus beyond 'every assertion ... beyond 
every denial"'26. Turner insists (and I would concur) that such claims are 
neither leaps of "atheistical deconstruction" nor exercises in a "founda-
tionless, anti-metaphysical" apophaticism. Nevertheless, in the end, the 
conceptual moves are intended to get us to the realization that when we 
speak of God, we are talking about one who is not like any other and we 
are using our ordinary language in a way that is significantly different 
from other ways of signifying. The force of this argument requires that 
the logic of description in God's case is not what it is in every other case. 
Inattentiveness to this metaphoric move and its necessary relation to its 
roots in the soil of medieval metaphysics and vocabulary (fields of mean-
ings) is precisely what Turner faults in both the apophaticism of Derrida 
and some contemporary spiritualities. The issue here, as in the Bracken-
10hnson discussion, is not just that parties in dispute apparently have dif-
ferent concepts of being or of apophaticism. One discussion partner does 
22. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, The Complete Works , trans. C. LUIBHEID, New York, 
Paulist, J 987 , p. 98. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Compare the contribution by Denys Turner on Atheism, Apophaticism and 
"Dif!erallce" in this volume pp. 689-708, esp. 691. 
25 . Ibid. , p. 701. 
26. Ibid. , p. 702. 
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not recognize the metaphoric moves operative in the other's fields of 
meanings and so misses the force and logic of the other's arguments. 
In the article mentioned earlier, I show how David Burrell and Karl 
Rahner's readings of Aquinas led them to conclude as well that, properly 
speaking, talk of God always entails this logical difference from talk 
about every other reality. That is what Rahner meant when he insisted that 
affirmations properly apply to God only as mystery. I take this to be the 
ultimate meaning of his claim, shared by many other Catholic theolo-
gians, that talk of God is necessarily analogical. The reason for describ-
ing this talk further as metaphoric, besides distinguishing it from mis-
guided attempts to find a "most apt analogy", is to indicate that the 
positive insight and knowledge is achieved through the distortion in 
accustomed fields of meanings. The new understanding is brought about 
by the stretching of language itself and not with some new concept or 
analogy for grasping God27. It is the forcing of the analogies that open 
up the possibility for new meaning - for using everyday language to speak 
towards what is beyond its ken. This is why properly speaking, at least 
in the Christian conception, talk about God is inherently rooted in and 
essentially related to a metaphoric process and why I suggest that inat-
tentiveness to this process and its essential conversational character is a 
source of theological confusion. 
I do not suppose for a moment that recognition of this metaphoric 
dimension in itself is all that we need to clarify our theological muddles. 
Turner wondered at the conclusion of his paper what Christoff Schwoebel 
could possibly mean when he said " that it was a mark of our philosoph-
ical sinfulness that we make the pattern of our existence to be the pattern 
of the divine - as if there were some, even notional , alternative state of 
affairs, some other, pre-Iapsarian possibilities of language about God from 
which we have fallen away"28. One might address a similar question to 
Anne Hunt who concluded that the Paschal Mystery "explodes the very 
notion of conversation as we know it"29. Schwoebel 's recommendation 
27. The limitation of Wim A. de Pater's analysis of the analogy of attribution, from 
this perspective, is that it does not draw attention to this shift in fields of meanings although 
I believe it, like Burrell 's position, presupposes such a shift. My aim is not to take excep-
tion to such interpretations but rather to point to this further aspect and its importance for 
clarifying what is going on in God-talk. See W. DE PATER, Analogy and Disclosures: 
On Religious Language, in Metaphor and God-talk (n. 7), pp. 33-44. 
28. Compare the question by D. Turner on p. 706 of this volume, referring to 
C. S CHWOBEL, God as Conversation . Reflections on a Theological Ontology of Commu-
nicative Relations, pp. 53-55 (IV. Disrupting the Conversation: Sin). 
29. Compare the article by Anne Hunt on Trinity and Paschal Mystery: Divine Com-
munion and Human Conversation, in this volume, p. 96. 
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looks to me a classic Lutheran metaphoric turn and Professor Hunt pro-
poses a variation on a tum of thought recommended by von Balthasar. 
Whether and how others of us might accept such recommendations will 
not be resolved simply by noting their metaphoric character. To show 
that their affirmations are metaphoric does not prove them true. On the 
other hand, if I am correct about the metaphoric character of their posi-
tions, genuine engagement with their claims presupposes recognition of 
this metaphoric thrust. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If talk of God is intrinsically metaphoric in this way and, as Karl Rah-
ner persuasively argued, the human person is defined intrinsically by 
openness to God, there is a sense too in which the identity of the other, 
our neighbour, is also beyond any adequate grasp of our conceptualiza-
tions. But as Professor Haers indicated so clearly in his paper, for me 
even to state the issue this way suggests that encounter with neighbour 
begins with myself and entails merely my finding things in common with 
the other. This makes it sound as if I am in a position to get an adequate 
grasp of my connectedness to God and neighbour; the task is merely to 
find the right analogies for comprehending them. But as long a I begin 
with myself as privileged centre for encounter and presume that the God 
or neighbour can come within my grip, there is no space for the claim of 
our prior connectedness and for genuine encounter with them as irre-
ducible other to emerge. There is a metaphoric thrust to the Christian 
claim that in Christ we are all sisters and brothers, or to the confession 
(shared with Jews and Muslims) that we are all children of God. To get 
the point entailed in these affirmations requires a fundamental shift in 
our field of meanings. For the point is not that we are " like" sisters and 
brothers, but that we "are". Although I agree with Professor Haers that 
it would be misleading to describe this fundamental conviction as a par-
adigm change, since it is central to the core of Christian faith and not 
something new, the notion is also more than a mere metaphor, albeit a 
root one. Hence I think it important to add, what I hope is not an impo-
sition on Professor Haers's argument but a kind of "midrash", that to 
opt for such an affIrmation as a root metaphor is to call with the prophets 
for teshuva: a turn or conversion in thinking and living. It requires such 
a turn because a thinking and living which seeks to centre itself in the 
"other", rather than the in the "I", requires an openness to the gift of the 
other and the givenness of our prior connectedness. It is not something 
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that the " I" can establish for itself. The " turning" is never complete 
because no conversion can ever capture the neighbour or God. The turn-
ing is metaphoric because it requires a radical shift in our fields of mean-
ings about self, God and neighbour. 
This then is the brief for my suggestions at the beginning of the talk. 
Properly speaking, talk of God is always rooted in and essentially related 
to a metaphoric process. Conversation and encounter, consequently, are 
not merely apt metaphors for theological thinking. Theological thinking 
as inherently metaphoric, when successful, is intrinsically conversational 
and fundamentally directed toward encounter with God and neighbour, as 
other and mystery. Attention to the logic of this essentially conversational 
dynamic is crucial to understanding our thinking and talk about our 
encounter with God and neighbour - especially in our pluralistic world 
with its many intersecting but also disparate conversations. 
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